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I. CROSS CURRENTS
(a) 1934 and 1974 Acts: Parallels and Analogies
IN a number of respects, the efforts made under the 1934 Trade Agree-
ments Act and the 1974 Trade Act to expand American trade were
similarly motivated, their basic purpose being to counteract the
economic slump in the United States by promoting international trade.
These legislative initiatives followed a soul-searching debate which
found fault with the policy of economic isolationism into which the
United States and the world at large were drifting. However, while the
general plan of action and the expected results suggest a similarity of
purpose at both periods, the international situation in 1974 differed
profoundly from that of 1934.
In 1934 Trade Agreements Act sought to extricate the U.S. economy
from the consequences of the Smoot-Hawley Act 1 by mutually agreed
tariff concessions. Bilateral negotiations were then the only approach
and technique available. Today, the main role in efforts to expand and
liberalise trade belongs to multilateral negotiations involving tariffs and
non-tariff barriers whose object is to determine the conditions of inter-
national trade within the world economic system of which the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a part.2 The 1974 Act
takes note of the fact that GATT is an informal international organisa-
tion supported by a number of international economic institutions such
as the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank, the Pro-
gram of Assistance to Less Developed Countries.8
In certain respects, ,the 1974 Act is a continuation of the 1934 legisla-
tion. The basic technique of the 1934 Act by which trade expansion is
to be achieved has remained the same. New trade opportunities must
be gained by the offer of reciprocity to foreign experts.
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1 P.L. 361 (1934), 46 Stat. 590.
2 Cf. infra, -text related to n. 70.
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The President whenever he finds as a fact that any existing duties or other
import restrictions of the United States or any foreign country are
unduly ... restricting the foreign trade of the United States ... is author-
ized from time to time (1) to enter into foreign trade agreements ... (2) to
proclaim such modifications of existing duties and other import restric-
tions . . . as are required ... to carry out foreign trade agreements. ... 4
This authority was first limited to a three-year period, but was sub-
sequently periodically extended until 1962, when the Congress passed
the Trade Expansion Act, and is now again extended by the 1974
Trade Act.
The original (1934) authorised tariff reduction was 50 per cent. of the
rates in force in 1934; it was followed by another authorisation of a
reduction in tariff of an additional 50 per cent. of the rates in force in
1945 5 under the 1945 Trade Agreements Extension Act. Since 1945
tariff reduction authorisations have been much more modest-15 per
cent, under the 1955 Act 6 and 20 per cent. under the 1958 7 Extension
of the Trade Agreements Act, a reaction to the formation of the Euro-
pean Common Market with its programme for eliminating tariffs and
custom duties among the then six member nations.
In 1962 1 Congress renewed the President's negotiating authority for
an additional period of five years. It expired in 1967, leaving the
President with no authority to negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions
until the 1974 Trade Act was enacted. This lapse of authority and Con-
gressional resistance to further concessions reflect the often declared
reluctance to continue the policy of trade liberalisation. In this climate,
a new approach had to be worked out, and a new balance between con-
flicting interests established. There was an unsuccessful effort to enact
an interim measure (Trade Act of 1970) 0 which was intended to give
the President the power to make minor adjustments in order to com-
pensate a foreign country when it became necessary to raise the duty
on a specific article, as the result of "escape clause" action. When the
1974 Trade Act became law, the Administration had been for more
than seven years without authority to negotiate, although already, in
1973, members of the GATT were gearing themselves for a new round
of negotiations-the Tokyo Round-with a view to taking another
step ,towards the liberalisation of foreign trade.
The 1974 Act and the Tokyo Round (of which moreis said later)
were a continuation of the policies initiated in 1934, but they were also
a move in a new direction. They both raised novel issues: to reform
the GATT and to remove, or at least to regulate, non-tariff barriers to
trade which had demonstrated convincingly the inadequacy of the then
existing arrangements.
4 48 Stat. 360.
5 59 Stat. 460.
6 69 Stat. 160. T 72 Stat. 676.
8 76 Stat. 872. 9 H.R. 1897, 91st Cong. 2nd Sess. (1970).
The U.S. Trade Act of 1974
(b) The Political Climate
The Trade Act of 1974 10 was the capstone on vigorously competing
views about United States trade policy-views which became increas-
ingly strident during the years following the enactment of the 1962
Trade Expansion Act:
From 1934 until 1962, beginning with the reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
and culminating in the "Kennedy" round of tariff reductions (negotiated
under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962), United States tariff protection was
consistently reduced. The Kennedy round, however, marked the end of an
era. During the past ten years there has developed a growing disillusion-
ment with the overall trade policy embodied in the series of tariff reduc-
tions produced under the reciprocal trade agreements program. A number
of reasons have been given for this trend: increasingly serious balance of
payments problems after 1958, intensified competition at home and abroad
from the growth of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan,
disenchantment with the success of economic aid to the lesser developed
countries, the increased use by foreign competitors of nontariff protective
devices (particularly by the EEC and by Japan), the growth of multi-
national corporations, and the rapid increase in the level of domestic
unemployment since 1970.11
The consequent change in the tenor of Congressional debate during
this period is conveniently mirrored by the avowed purposes sought
to be achieved through enactment of diverse trade Bills.12 Thus, the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 purported:
(1) to'stimulate the economic growth of the United States and maintain
and enlarge foreign markets for the products of United States agriculture,
industry, mining and commerce; (2) to strengthen economic relations with
foreign countries through the development of open and nondiscriminatory
trading in the free world; and (3) to prevent. Communist economic
penetration.'S
A decade later, however, the trade reform bills introduced in Con-
gress no longer emphasised "the benefits which might accrue domes-
tically as a consequence of increased international trade levels and
trade liberalisation, and [no longer] viewed free trade as an indepen-
dently valuable gain." "
The already mentioned Trade Act of 1970 (also known as the
"Mills Bill "), as reported out of the House Committee,'15 was a
synthesis of the original' Administration proposal 16 and the largely
10 Trade Act of' 1974, s. 101 (a) (1). Public Law 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
11 American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Burke Hartke
Foreign Trade and Investment Proposal (1973).
12 See Ohly, The Kennedy Round: Estimated Effects and Empirical Evidence
Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess., Pts. 1-15, at 159 (1973) (hereinafter cited as House Trade Hearings).
is 19 U.S.C., s. 1801 (1962).
14 Ohly, supra n. 12.
'5 H.R. 18970. The most incisive discussion of the " Mills Bill " is contained in
Metzger, " The Mills Bill," 5 J. World Trade L. 235 (1971).
l H.R. 14870, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). H.R. 14870 largely paralleled the pro-
visions contained in the shoft-lived H.R. 17551, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968), intro-
duced by Wilbur Mills at the request of the Johnson Administration.
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protectionist1 7 measures propounded by Chairman Mills. 8 Due to
measures introduced through the latter Bill, the Trade Act of 1970
adopted a regressive omnibus approach to trade reform by providing
for a variety of changes in then existing U.S. trade laws which, "both
in number and in consequence, [were] intended to restrain, and [would]
result in the reduction of international trade." '9 The Act proposed
absolute import quotas 20 on selected textiles and footwear products,
2 1
and a significant relaxation of the causation and injury prerequisite to
the imposition of import restrictions.' 2 Additionally, Executive auth-
ority was sharply circumscribed 28:
[Flor the first time since the escape clause was originated in 1947, [the
Bill] sharply curtailed the President's discretion to accept or reject Tariff
Commission findings and recommendations in escape clause cases.24
Furthermore, amendments " to the Anti-dumping Act of 1921 26
would have required abbreviated inspection and verification pro-
cedures on the part of the Treasury Department, thereby effectively
serving to promote the premature levying of anti-dumping duties.' 7
Finally, the Bill 28 would have liberalised the implementation of the
countervailing duty provisions of the Trade Act of 1930.29
17 H.R. 16920, unlike H.R. 14870 (supra), did not call for the repeal of the
American Selling Price system of valuation.
18 See Note, " Trade Bill of 1970," 3 Law & Policy in Int. Bus. 625 (1971; Rehm,
"Proposed Trade Act of 1970: What Direction U.S. Foreign Trade Policy?" 2
J.Mar.L. & Corn. 289 (1971).
10 Metzger, supra n. 13 at p. 235.
20 "An absolute quota imposes an absolute ceiling on imports beyond which no
more imports may enter. A tariff quota, on the other hand, provides that imports
may exceed a given ceiling but only by paying a higher duty." Rehm, supra n. 16 at
p. 305, n. 43. See, generally, Note, "Protectionism and the 90th Congress-A Case
Study of Steel and Textile Industries," 2 N.Y.U.J.Int. Law & Politics 64 (1969).
21 s. 321.
22 s. 311.
23 s. 313.
'4 Metzger, supra n. 15 at p. 243.
25 s. 341.
28 19 U.S.C., ss. 160 et seq. (1970). The Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, as amended,
provides that when a foreign company dumps merchandise in the United States, the
Treasury Department shall levy anti-dumping duties equivalent to the dumping mar-
gins. Two requirements are essential for a dumping finding under the U.S. legislation:
(i) a Treasury Department " determination of sales at less than fair value," and (ii) a
determination of injury by the Tariff Commission. " [Siales at less than fair value nor-
mally takes'place when merchandise is sold for less in the United States than in the
home market." 1 Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, Papers
395, in American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, supra n. 8 at pp.
31-32.
27 See Metzger, supra n. 15 at pp 255-260; Rehm, supra n. 16 at p. 309.
28 s. 302:
29 19 U.S.C., s. 1303. The Countervailing Duty Law was enacted .in substantially
its present form in 1897. It requires the Secretary of the Treasury to assess a special
duty on imported dutiable merchandise, 'benefiting from the payment or bestowal of
a " bounty or grant." The special duty is always equivalent to the " bounty or
grant," the purpose of the law being to nullify such -benefits. 1 Commission on
International Trade and Investment Policy,' Papers' 409, in" American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, supra n. 8 at p. 33.
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The Mills Bill, though passed in the House, was effectively blocked
in the Senate.30 On January 21, 1971, it was re-introduced by Chair
man Mills in the Second Session of.Congress as the Trade Act of
1971. 1. It failed to draw Administration support, however, and was
ultimately not -reported out of either the House or Senate Committees.
Comparable -to the Mills Bill was the Foreign Trade and Investment
Act of 1972,32 otherwise known as the "Burke-Hartke Bill." 3 Intro-
duced in both Houses, the Bill had as its avowed purpose to "dis-
courage American business investment abroad and [to] limit the flow
of imports into this country." 34 Impetus for this legislation was con-
cededly grounded on fears generated by the United States balance of
payments problems and on the concern of organised labour that
domestic jobs were being lost through increased production abroad by
United States corporations. 5 According to one of its sponsors:
[w]ithout it [the Bill] the heavy export of jobs, technology and capital by
companies based in this country will continue unabated . . . [T~he tech-
nology produced by American genius will be better supervised and control-
led, so that American workers are more fully benefitted by these advances.38
The Burke-Hartke amendments accordingly proposed to roll back
imports through a panoply of measures, including mandatory quotas, 37
the curtailing of certain preferential tariff -treatment,8 reform of the
antidumping 39 and countervailing duty 4 0 laws, and amendments to
the "escape clause" provisions of the Trade Expansion Act.41
30 " In the face of divided Administration counsel and no leadership from the
White House, bi-partisan group of 22 determined Senators . . . blocked this protec-
tionist legislation," ibid. at p. 235. The Senate Committee.on Finance, however, did
approve in executive session the basic provisions of the House Bill as an amendment
to the Social Security Bill, H.R. 17550, s. 301-378, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970). See
S. Rep. No. 1431; 91st Cong.; 2nd Sess., at p. 238 (1970).
31 H.R. 20, S. 4, 92nid Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See 117 Cong. Rec. 171; Note, " The
Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign Trade Policy,"
81 Yale L.J. 11418 (1971).
32 S. 2592, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 10914, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
On January 3, 1973, the Bill was reintroduced in the 93rd Congress, First Session,
as S. 151 and H.R. 62. Additionally, on January 18, 1973, Senator Hartke segregated
the Bill into eight major parts and introduced each as separate Bills-S. 430, S. 434,
S. 435, S. 439, S. 441, S. 442, S. 443 and S. 447.
33 For its sponsors, Representative James A. Burke (D-Mass.) and Senator Vance
Hartke (D-Ind.).
34 117 Cong. Rec. 33584 (remarks of Senator Hartke).
35 See American Enterprise Institute, supra n. 8, at 5.
38 117 Cong. Rec. 33583 (remarks of Senator Hartke).
37 s. 301. 38 s. 703.
39 s. 401 . 40 s. 402.
41 ss. 501 and 502. For many years, the Congress has required that an " escape
clause " be included in each trade agreement. The rationale for the "escape clause
has been, and remains, .that as barriers to international trade are'lowered,' some
industries and workers inevitably face serious injury, dislocation and perhaps economic
extinction. The " escape clause" is aimed at providing temporary, relief for an
industry suffering from serious injury, or the threat thereof, so that the industry will
have sufficient time to adjust to the freer international competition. . .. . By reason
of the Congressional requirement, the trade agreements to which the United States is
a pity confain an escape clause or equivalent provision. Typical and of most general
effect is art. XIX.L (a) of the General' Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: " If; as a
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Exports, for their part, would be curtailed by means of increased
taxation of multinational corporate activity 4 2 and by direct control of
exported capital and technology41
In sum, pressures in Congress for protectionist trade legislation such
as that contained in the Mills and Burke-Hartke Bills have faithfully
reflected changes in the domestic economic situation, as well as changes
in the country's relations with the rest of the trading world.
(c) The Administration's Proposal
It was against such a background that President Nixon issued his April
10, 1973 message, at the same time as the proposed Trade Reform Act
of 1973 was transmitted to Congress:
[W]hile trade should be more open, it should also be more fair. [This]
means that the benefits of trade should be fairly distributed among Ameri-
can workers, farmers, businessmen and consumers alike and that trade
should create no undue burdens for any of these groups.4 4
result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a
contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is
being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic pro-
ducers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may
be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole
or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession." S.Rep. No. 93-1298, in U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News, 7263, 93rd Cong. 2nd Sess.
42 ss. 102 and 103. The result of the present tax provisions is that the American
people and the U.S. Treasury pay the bill for economic losses to the U.S. economy
due to the expansion of multinational corporations abroad. Because of these tax pro-
visions, American tax-payers will continue to help subsidise the treasuries of foreign
countries and the expansion of U.S.-based firms abroad. Despite the fact that U.S.
government agencies have now demonstrated the tax advantages of producing abroad
instead of in the United States, the new bill fails to recognise this problem: U.S.
multinationals paid about 5 per cent. in taxes int 1970; the U.S. corporate tax rate
is 48 per cent. Taxes paid to countries whose embargo on oil and threatened stop-
pages of other needed supplies are credited against the U.S. Treasury-a subsidy to
those who jeopardise the American economy by withholding supplies, who add to
U.S. inflation by hiking prices, and who provide walls behind which any firm can
expand and export to the United States and abroad-so that a corporation would
gain no net advantage by operating in foreign countries. S. Rep No. 93-1298 (remarks
of Senator Hartke) in 4 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7366-67, 93rd Cong. 2nd
Sess. (1974).
43 ss. 601 and 602. For selective treatment of the control of technology transfer,
see Mirabito, "The Control of Technology Transfer: The Burke-Hartke Legislation
and the Andean Foreign Investment Code; the MNE Faces the Nation," 9 Int. Law
215 (1975). Cf. Evans, "New Directions in the U.S. Trade Policy," 5 Law & Policy
in Int. Bus. 1 (1973).
" [T]he bill would deny the nation's consumers freedom of choice in the purchase
of goods and boost price levels at least $10 to $15 billion. . . .American workers
would be net losers, both as workers and consumers. . . . [Mlore U.S. jobs and
higher paying jobs at that, would be lost in the reduction of our exports than will
be gained as domestic production substituted for exports. . . .Domestic price rises
pressured by the legislation would substantially erode the international competitiveness
of the U.S. . . . Foreign nations would retaliate, economically and politically."
Statement of Secretary of Commerce, Peter G. Peterson to the American Retail
Federation, reported in Commerce Today, May 15, 1972, cited in American Enterprise
institute for Public Policy Research, supra n. 8, at p. 11.
44 9 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, No. 9, at p. 343 (April 16,
1973); H.R. Doe. No. 93-80, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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Summarised in its transmittal message, the Administration's pro-
posals contemplated four basic provisions: (i) it would increase Presi-
dential negotiating and executive authority within the context of new
international trade agreements; (ii) it would liberalise those standards
necessary to the application of import restrictions and implementation
of adjustment assistance; (iii) it would afford the President's authority
to grant Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment to communist coun-
tries; (iv) it would allow for preferential tariff treatment for developing
countries. "
(d) Debate in the House
Submitted in anticipation of a new GAT-' round of multilateral
trade negotiations scheduled to commence in Tokyo,47 H.R. 6767 pre-
dictably won less than universal domestic support in respect of the
trade liberalisation and increased presidential negotiating authority
provisions that were the central feature of that Bill 48:
The most important shift in U.S. political constellation on trade policy
[was] organized labor's move to the protectionist camp. This shift cannot
be explained simply by high unemployment. Labor was becoming more
protectionist even as unemployment was dropping steadily after 1962, and
had adopted a completely protectionist stance when unemployment stood
at its post-Korea low in early 1969 .... Organized workers have apparently
achieved sufficient income levels that the movement as a whole [had]
become more interested in avoiding shifts of geographic location, seniority
rights, local interests, etc., than in seeking higher real incomes elsewhere. 49
Testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee, Leonard
Woodcock, President of the United Auto Workers Union, urged Con-
gress largely "to ignore the Administration trade proposal and to
45 Ibid. See also Davis. " The Trade Reform Act of 1973," 15 Harv. Int. L.J. 126
(1974).
48 The GATT is comprehensively treated in Jackson, World Trade and the Law of
the GATT (1969). See also Jackson, " The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in United States Domestic Law," 66 Mich. L. Rev. 249 (1967).
47 See generally Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting, Tokyo, September 12-14,
1973, GAT Press Release GAIT/ 1134 (Sept. 14, 1973), in 12 Int. Legal Materials
1533-35 (1973).
48 See e.g. Cong. Rec. (Dec. 10, 1973) (remarks of Congressman Dent). But see the
remarks of Congressman Landrum which were made during the floor debate on
whether the Administration's Bill was properly to be considered by the House: "I
would say to the members from my region of the country which is concerned pri-
marily with agricultural products and textiles that it is imperative that we have
this ...Bill. Our negotiators today are in Geneva trying to negotiate a renewal of
the long-term cotton agreement that expired in September. They are hoping to get
into a renewal agreement an'understanding that will include man-made fibres as well
as cotton, and unless we have this, the textile industry, the agricultural industry, and
more than 2 million employees in the apparel and textile industry are going to suffer
a serious set-back." Ibid. at 10917-18.
49 Bergsten, " Crisis in U.S. Trade Policy," 49 Foreign Aflairs 630, 635 (1971). See
also the remarks of Congressman Dent wherein he introduced letters from numerous
labour organisations calling for defeat of the bill, among them the UAW, the Inter-
national Union of Electrical Workers, the Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher
Workmen, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. 119 Cong. Rec. 10, pp. 968-970 (Dec.
10, 1973).
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fashion new trade legislation... . 5 Paramount concern was expressed
over the inadequacy of the provisions for adjustment assistance; while
the Bill significantly liberalised the circumscriptive language of the
Trade Expansion Act,51 job security alone was no longer sufficient as
a yardstick-health care and insurance protection, pension rights,
fringe benefits, and seniority were not to be compromised. Reservations
were voiced over "the breathtaking powers to be given to the Presi-
dent, at the further expense of Congress," 52 and over the tax incen-
tives for overseas investment activity by U.S.-based multinational
corporations. As to the latter issue, the UAW was in accord with the
Burke-Hartke provisions. Woodcock cautioned, however, that the
UAW's "chief deviation from Burke-Hartke is on the use of quotas
and the rest, which we think would lead to a retaliatory trade war to
the detriment of this and all the other involved countries." 1s In short,
the Burke-Hartke approach to trade reform was "not recom-
mended." 14
Representing the AFL-CIO, I. W. Abel 15 was even more adamant
in opposing the Trade Bill, characterising it as "bad legislation, con-
taining confusing and conflicting provisions, wrapped in not-so-plain
language. It is a patchwork of yesterday's answers for tomorrow's
problems. It ignores the realities of today." 6 In particular, the AFL-
5o Trade Hearings 849. In the Senate hearings, Senator Hartke agreed with Wood-
cock that " the Trade Bill betrays labour."
51 19 U.S.C. sec. 1901 (c) (1), (2) & (3) (1970). The prerequisites for import relief
for beleagured domestic industries-which also correspond to those underlying an
allowance for adjustment assistance-were construed by the Tariff Commission in
Non-rubber Footwear 6 (No. 359, Jan. 1971), noted in " Recent Decisions," 7 Texas
Jnt.L.J. 163 (1971). See Bale, " Adjustment Assistance Under the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962," 9 J.Int.L. & Economics 49 (1974); Robertson, " Adjustment Assistance
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: A Will-O'-the Wisp," 33 Geo.Wash.L.Rev.
1088 (1965).
52 House Trade Hearings, p. 851.
53 Ibid. at p. 880.
54 Mr. Woodcock: " [lIf you will forgive me, we are still not standing along with
the rest of the labor movement in support of your Bill."
Senator Hartke: " I understand. As long as you come out for the principles for
which I stand, you can support anybody you want to. You are for quotas [sic] and
I am for quotas."
Hearings on H.R. 10710 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93rd Cong., 2nd
Sess., at 863 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
55 In the Senate, the AFL-CIO was represented by its president, George Meany.
By far, he was the most outspoken of all public witnesses in his calling not for
merely a revision of U.S. trade policies by "an entire restructuring based on the
recognition that the concept of free trade versus protectionism which dominated the
thinking of the thirties and forties is badly out of phase With today." Senate Hearings,
at p. 1136. Meany's testimony characterised the Bill in no uncertain terms as " totally
obsolete . ..worse than no Bill at all." Ibid. Increasing imports displacing American
jobs, as well as vast expansion of agricultural exports, together had redounded to the
marked detriment of the American consumer. In particular, 'Meany attacked the
export of sophisticated American technology, which has led to an erosion of America's
industrial base. Few words were minced in recommending to -the Senate such pro-
posals as a reduction in imports, regulation of multinational firms-including banks-
and elimination of U.S. tax advantages and other subsidies. Ibid.
66 House Trade Hearings, p. 1216.
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CIO opposed that portion of the Bill which drastically changed the
relationship between Congress and the Executive in regard to the
negotiation and approval of agreements to reduce non-tariff trade bar-
riers (NTBs) such as quotas and markings of country of origin."
Representing interests that were threatened by any dilution of such
NTBs, the AFL-CIO predictably were apprehensive over the fact that
congressional consultation and " approval" of any negotiated reduc-
tions in this area were in fact optional and within the discretion of the
President. 8 It is no surprise, therefore, that the posture of the AFL-
CIO vis-h-vis the Burke-Hartke amandments was in marked contrast
to the views espoused by the UAW:
[T]he AFL-CIO supports the Burke-Hartke Foreign Trade and Investment
Act of 1973. . . . We believe that H.R. 62 provides a rational, logical,
reasonable framework for attacking the pressing problems we face as a
result of our world trade position. These problems are, as we have said,
the result of a fundamental change in America's economic position in
relation to the rest of the world, and this change requires a fundamental
shift in policy. We believe the Burke-Hartke Bill provides this fundamental
change. It points the way to getting at the specific problems we see
threatening our future economic well being. It is not a protectionist theory,
it is a pragmatic approach based on an.analysis of the problems for their
causes.
59
On October 10, 1973, the House Ways and Means Committee
reported out an amended version of H.R. 6767; the debate had lasted
more than five months and had produced in excess of five thousand
pages of testimony.60 Although largely paralleling the Administration's
draft proposal, H.R. 10710 contained several important revisions intro-
duced by the Committee,61 not the least of which was the "Jackson-
Vanik Amendment" which would prohibit the extension of Most
Favoured Nation treatment to any communist country that denied its
citizens the opportunity to emigrate freely.6 2
The Administration had, in effect, won major victories-as against
the protectionists-on four of the five major provisions 6 3 in its original
57 s. 103 (d).
58 " The basic change from prior law is the provision for presidential discretion
almost without limit, the right to negotiate changes and impose them almost at will,
and the authority to act without prior congressional or public approval to impose
decisions reached abroad in secretwith little of these actions subject to congressional
veto. . . .The President's proposal also asks for advance authority from Congress
to negotiate the removal of non-tariff barriers. One of these non-tariff barriers is
marking of origin. That means that a product imported into this-country must carry
a stamp showing the country of origin; if it was made in Hong Kong, it must show
it was made in- Hong Kong. . . .We think this is an important provision in the
present trade law that we would want to be made even more definitive. We want to
know where the goods and components are coming from, and the American people
want to know where they are coming from." House Trade Hearings, p. 1217.
59 Senate Hearings at pp. 1222-1224.
60 See generally House Trade Hearings.
61 See H.R.Rep. No. 93-571, 93rdCong.,.lst Sess. (1973).
62 See 119 Cong. Rec. 6920-21.-
63 To recapitulate, see text related to n. 47 supra.
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proposal; it clearly lost on the MFN issue. 4 On December 11, 1973,
H.R. 10710 was passed by the House and subsequently submitted to
the Senate Committee on Finance which began hearing on March 4,
1974.
(e) The Senate Revisions
From its introduction in the Senate committee 0 to final ratification by
both Houses of Congress took another nine months. The volume of
testimony put before the Committee was also considerable. The cast of
characters was slightly varied, but the impetus of the dialogue-and
often the language itself-differed imperceptibly. 6 In the committee,
the Trade Act of 1974, Public Law 93-618, was beginning to take final
shape, and as if to justify the Senate's prolonged absorption with it,
the changes made in it were many. Substantively, however, the majority
of the issues had been predetermined and real revisions were few.
The Public Law 93-618 signed on January 3, 1975, by President
Nixon's successor essentially follows the Administration's proposed
draft submitted almost two years earlier. Four of the five basic provi-
sions escaped major modification in Congress. Even the MFN provision
-though it did not survive in the proffered form-probably incor-
porates as much of the original as could reasonably have been
expected.
II. TOWARDS A NEW REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(a) The Thrust of the 1974 Act
The provisions of the 1974 Act fall within two classes. To the first class
belong: Title I (Negotiating authority), Title IV (Trade with Countries
64 See generally Staff o! Senate Comm. on Finance, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., " The
Trade Reform Act of 1973 " (Comm. Print 1974) [Hereinafter cited as Comm. Print],
in particular, title IV of the Act, s. 401 and 402. By a mindbogglingly complex pro-
cedure, the Committee on Ways and Means attempted to stifle to the utmost the
President's authority to grant MFN treatment to communist countries. It chose to do
this, however, in such a disguised manner that it wasted fully four pages on unintel-
ligible language which can only cause problems of future construction.
65 See S.Rep. No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974).
66 In the Senate-as in the House-while conceding that " what came out of the
House was somewhat better than that proposed by the administration," the UAW
reiterated its ' opposition to the Bill in its totality because of ... willfully inadequate
provisions for adjustment ": Senate Hearings 858.
Mr. Meany. " I want to remind you, Senator [Hartke], we of the American trade
union movement from the time of the Hull reciprocal trade pacts, were free traders.
We were free traders right down the line, but we have got a different situation today.
In those days we were for lower tariffs. We were dealing with backward European
policies where they had the cartel system. But this is a different ballgame today
entirely. This is American multinationals. This is American money. This is American
technology. This is American know-how, and sitting back here is the American con-
sumer, and I say that trading with any of these other countries should be dictated
by our own self-interests. That is the way they trade. This is the way they do business.
They shut the door. You could not go to any of these' countries and come in there
with some kind of a trade deal that was going to take their jobs away." Ibid. at p.
1136.
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currently not receiving non-discriminatory Treatment), and Title V
(Generalized System of Preferences) dealing with conditions of trade.
To the second class belong Title II (Relief from Injury Caused by
Import Competition) and Title III (Relief from Unfair Trade Prac-
tices). In other words, while trade liberalisation is the main target of
the Act's provisions, it also contains techniques and procedures which
permit the U.S. Government to correct miscalculations or effects of
legitimate or illegitimate competition.
The Act is primarily addressed (Title I) to countries who are part-
ners in trade with the United States and with whom it is desirable to
establish a world trade system leading to fair and equitable social and
economic relations based on comparative advantage, in the hope that
this would promote, to everybody's profit, a more perfect international
division of labour.
It is also important that non-market economy countries (Title IV)
should be involved, in one form or another in the world system of
trade. Owing to their structural characteristics, however, a wholesale
approach is not possible. Each country must be treated on its merits,
and where most favoured nation (MFN) status has been achieved, this
is to be respected. The extension of MFN status to other member
countries of the socialist bloc depends upon their willingness to meet
certain minimal standards in the area of human rights (and in par-
ticular freedom of emigration). Special provisions apply to developing
countries (Title V) who, as aspirants to full member status in the first
group, and because of their backward condition, need economic assist-
ance, protection for their infant industries, and preferential treatment
for their export trade, to finance their economic development.
The outline of the international trade policy in Titles I, IV and V
is paralleled by Titles II and III which deal with those adverse
effects of trade liberalisation which call for the application of correc-
tive measures, requiring trade competition. A distinction is made
between legitimate import competition and unfair trade practices which
distort conditions of trade, such as subsidies, grants, remission of
taxes, etc. In the first case, the purpose of the measures is to blunt the
social effects of import competition. In the'second case, the purpose is
to deal with unfair trade practices and eliminate sources of competition
which cannot produce fair trading based on the comparative advantage
to individual nations to be derived from the international division of
labour.67
The present essay is primarily concerned with the policy of reform-
ing the current international trade mechanism to take account of
GATT's new. role. This policy does not always appear clearly in the
67 Cf. infra, text related to n. 108.
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1974 Act; specific circumstances have affected the final product of the
legislative process and clouded the perspective of the Act. The U.S.
Government realised that the "policy of trade expansion... depends
on broad domestic support which suffered.., considerable erosion " in
the 1960s. Important sectors of organised labour and of the business
community had reached the conclusion that temporary relief from
injurious import competition was virtually inaccessible and that
grievances over allegedly unfair import competition would not be given
full or timely consideration in Washington.
In order to promote further the policy of trade liberalisation the
Trade Act had to make concessions to both labour and business points
of view.(8
(b) Disruption of the GATT
At ,the time when the draft of the Trade Reform Act of 1973 was sub-
mitted to the House, the international trade regime which had slowly
developed after World War II found itself under considerable stress.
Its main instrument was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
of 1947 structured round the Most Favoured Nation clause and an
obligation to follow the principle of non-discrimination and fair trade
practices. It also bound its members to a progressive elimination of
trade barriers.6 9
At the moment when GATT came into force, it was joined by 34
States and was dominated by Western industrial nations. Today there
are over 100 States associated with the GATT and the developed
countries are a minority. The core of the GATT system is the prin-
ciple of Most Favoured Nation, which rules out discrimination. 70 With
the emergence of the Common Market, Latin American Free Trade
Area, East African Common Market, the Andean Common Market,
and various other trading organisations, GATr lost its original unity
and homogeneity, and evolved into a superstructure of trading systems,
based upon the formation of a number of foreign trade areas, each of
them with its own influences and discriminations. While the capacity
of most of these "markets" is generally insignificant, the European
Common Market (EEC) represents an important barrier to a unitary
system of world trade, particularly in the area of agricultural products;
for its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the 'abolition by. it of
internal tariffs (customs union) discriminates against non-Common
08 Eberle, "U.S. Trade Policy-Appearance and Reality," N.Y. Times,' Dec. 7,
1975, 14: 3).
09 Cf. Whitney, " The Trade Act of 1974: Coping with Unequal Control Costs,"
16 B.C. Industrial'and Commercial L. Rev. at p. 605.
70 K. Dam, GATT, Law and International Economic .Organisation (1970); J.
Jackson, World Trade and the Law of the GATT (1968); See also, " The Trade Act
of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign Trade Policy," Y.L.I.,
Vol. 80, 1971, 1418 (78). •
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Market countries. In addition, the EEC negotiated preferential agree-
ments with a number of non-Market countries, beginning with Greece
and Turkey and ending with a group of some 50 countries which
joined the Lom6 Agreement covering Mediterranean countries, Africa
and Latin America, again acting outside the GATT framework. 71
In 1955 Japan joined the GATT, raising the level of trade com-
petition to an unprecedented level, and causing a number of con-
sequential difficulties. In defence of their interests, members of the
GATT resorted to practices hardly compatible with the non-discrimi-
nation and most favoured treatment principles which were the founda-
tion of the GATT. Finally, primary materials exporting countries, with
OPEC in the lead, established cartels which led to a raising of prices
and discrimination against consumer nations. The ultimate effect was
the ideological and functional bankruptcy of the GATT and a resort
to practices-non-tariff trade barriers-which were at odds with the
original vision of the GATT.7 2
With this background in mind, the primary role of the 1974 Act may
be seen as authorising the U.S. President to participate in the new
round of negotiations aimed at making the GATT once again a useful
instrument for the management of international trade in new con-
ditions. In this sense, the 1974 Act was to provide a long-range policy
programme.78
(c) The Tokyo Declaration
The feeling that the legal system of GATT had been outstripped by
developments and could no longer provide a useful instrument for the
management of world trade was shared by others. The Declaration of
the Ministers of GATT who met in Tokyo (September 12-14, 1973) 74
outlined a reform programme with an agenda which anticipated the
thrust of the 1974 Act. It included the following items: the reduction
of tariffs and the removal of non-tariff barriers, or, where that was not
altogether feasible, their application on the principle of non-discrimi-
nation to all member countries. The Declaration proposed a re-exami-
nation of article XIX of the GATT on multilateral safeguards (escape
clause) in order to promote further liberalisation of trade, and declared
Ministers' support for the principles of the GATT.
71 Convention ACP-CEE de Lomd (Afrique, Caraibe, Pacifique, Communaut6
Economique Europlenne), Jan. 31, 1975. Le Courrier, No. 31, March 1975.
72 Committee on Finance, United States Senate. World Oil Developments and U.S.
Oil Import Policies, A report prepared by the U.S. Tariff Commission, Dec. 12, 1973.
U.S. Govt. Printing Office. Cf. Dam. n. 77 at pp. 70-71, 265, 297-299, 347-350.
73 House Rep. No. 91-1435, 21. See also, R. E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System
and World Trade Diplomacy (1975), pp. 200-215.
74 GATT Press Release 1134, Sept. 14, 1973, XII International Legal Materials
1973, 1533..
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Special attention was given to the needs of the developing countries,
a problem which did not exist in 1947. In this connection, the Minis-
ters declared themselves in favour of the generalised system of prefer-
ences, out of recognition for the need for the protection of internal
markets of the developing countries, their weakness in regard to
balance of payments problems, and price stability for their products.
The declaration contained a promise that agriculture shall be specially
considered-an important item in the trade reform outlined in the 1974
Act.
Finally, the Ministers decided to approach the key problem of the
world ,trade system by recognising that-
The policy of liberalising world trade cannot be carried successfully in the
absence of parallel efforts to set up a monetary system which shields the
world economy from the shocks and imbalances which have previously
occurred. The Ministers will not lose sight of the fact that the efforts which
are to be made in the trade field imply continuing efforts to maintain
orderly conditions and to establish durable and equitable monetary systems.
The Ministers declared their support for the principles of the GATT
and promised to turn their attention to procedures to enforce them.
"Consideration shall be given," the Declaration goes on to say, "to
improvements of the international framework for the conduct of world
trade. .. ." Thus the declaration recognised that there was -little wrong
with the GATT system, except for procedures which needed improve-
ment and the tendency of groups of states to act on their own, depart-
ing from the principle of non-discrimination. As the Ministers stated,
negotiations should "reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures or, where
this is not appropriate, to reduce or eliminate their trade restricting or
distorting effects, and to bring such measures under more effective
international discipline." The declaration promised to consider a total
reduction of all trade restrictions in selected sectors.
(d) Recognition of the GATT
In the long tradition of U.S. foreign trade legislation, the Act of 1974
occupies an exceptional position. For the first time Congress recog-
nised the fact that the United States had become a member of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and that, within its frame-
work, a system of foreign trade was established which included prac-
tically all the important trading countries.
Already in the course of the Second ,World War, the U.S. and
Britain had discussed-within the general plan for the world political
order-the future regime of foreign trade and of economic co-opera-
tion. The outcome of these discussions was the Charter of the Inter-
national Trade Organisation, which was to include all members of the
United Nations and to be a part of the new world order to prevent
The U.S. Trade Act of 1974
future wars. In 1946, a conference representing a number of countries
assembled in London, appointed a Preparatory Committee to prepare
a draft of the Charter of the ITO, which was adopted by the full Con-
ference in Havana on March 24, 1948. 71 ITO was never ratified. Sub-
mitted to the Congress in April 1949, it was withdrawn by the State
Department in December 1950 71 after it became apparent that it had
no chance of approval. With ITO's failure in the United States, it
likewise was not ratified by any other country. Of the ITO Charter,
only Chapter Five (GATT) containing rules of international trade was
adopted, in December 1947 in Geneva, as an interim measure to pro-
vide a basis for the operation of the future ITO. It came into force in
January 1948, pursuant to a protocol of provisional application. 77 In
the United States its authority rested on the 1945 extension of the
Trade Agreements Act, and its status was that of an Executive Agree-
ment made pursuant to an earlier Congressional authorisation. 78 In
order to meet the conditions of that authorisation, 'the GATT was not
conceived as an international organisation but rather as a multilateral
trade agreement. Consequently, it contained no provisions regarding
its staff or organisation, the only official organ being the conference of
Contracting Parties. 79
From GATT's inception, the U.S. Congress' attitude was that GATT
was a trade policy instrument which was the exclusive responsibility
of the Executive, bound by the foreign trade rules as developed by the
U.S. internal legislation, and, as such, not a concern for the legislative
branch of government. The 1951 Extension of the Trade Agreements
Act, section 10, provided that "the enactment of this Act shall not be
construed to determine or indicate the approval or disapproval of the
Congress of the Executive Agreement known as the General Agree-
men-t on Tariffs and Trade." 80
In 1954-55, the Conference of the Contracting Parties assembled in
a Review Session which prepared a Charter of a formal Organisation
for Trade Co-operation (OTC) to administer the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. However, Congress refused to be moved, and
the proposal died.81
75 Hudec, n. 80, pp. 1943; Cf. W. A. Brown, The United States and the Restora-
tion of World Trade (1950), pp. 89-90.
70 Hudec, n. 73, at p. 50.
77 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
78 See n. 5.
79 Hudec, n. 73, at p. 54.
80 65 Stat. 72. To a certain extent the attitude of the Congress to GATT was the
result of the feeling of resentment due to the fact that GATT (a multinational agree-
ment) was made under the authority of the 1945 Trade Agreements Extension Act
which authorised bilateral negotiations only. (Gibson, "The Trade Reform Act
at Mid-Passage: A Commentary on H.R. 10710," 5 Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce (1374).
81 Hudec, n. 73, at p. 357, n. 28.
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Although Congress did maintain its hostile attitude toward the
GAT, it continued to grant the Administration the negotiating
authority needed to participate in the GATT tariff reductions nego-
tiations, and to fund U.S. participation in GATT. The provisions of
section 10 continued to appear in subsequent trade agreements legisla-
tion, but were omitted from the Trade Expansion Act which authorised
the Kennedy Round.
Section 10 returned as section 121 (d) of the 1974 Act. It was how-
ever in a new form which bears quotation in full:
(d) there are authorised to be appropriated annually such sums as may
be necessary for the payment by the United States of its share of the
expenses of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. This authorisation does not imply the approval or disapproval
by the Congress of all articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.
The immediate significance of section 121 (d) is that, from now on,
U.S. participation in -the conference and work of GATT is permanently
funded. In those terms the attitude of the Congress to GATT assumes
different proportions and reservations voiced in regard to it seem to be
directed to special provisions of the General Agreement which make it
a less perfect instrument of trade liberalisation policy, particularly in
the area of agricultural commodities.8 2
These impressions are strengthened by reference to the rest of sec-
tion 121, particularly those parts which set a programme of GATT
reform which, if realised, would indeed reconstruct GATT as an inter-
national organisation for the administration of an international trade
code.
One of the most important concessions which Congress has declared
its intention of making is that the President shall have power to take
action to bring U.S. trade agreements into line with the principles of
the open, non-discriminatory and fair world economic system. The
Congress reserved the right to approve of changes in such international
agreements, should they bring material changes in the Federal law,
except when the President acted in pursuance of an already obtained
authorisation' s
At the same time, section 121 (a) authorises the President to nego-
tiate changes in the GAT structure as regards: (a) the decision-
making process (giving the United States a weighted vote reflecting
the balance of economic interest); (b) revision of Article XIX (of the
GAIT) into a strong international safeguard procedure; (c) dispute
resolution, including regular consultations and a method of establishing
such a system within the GATT agreements dealing with restrictions
82 Dam, n. 70, at p. 257 et seq.
83 s. 121 (c).
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on imports of specific commodities; development of provisions dealing
with import restraints in relation to injurious imports and border
adjustments for international taxes (e.g. value added tax in the EEC);
measures designed in accordance with the GATT ar-ticles dealing with
balance of payments deficits; and assuring access to supplies of food,
raw materials, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. A special
provision proposes the adoption and inclusion in 'the General Agree-
ment of multilateral procedures with respect to member and non-
member countries which deny fair and equitable access to the supply
of food and other commodities and which substantially injure the'inter-
national community. In a special concession to labour interests, Con-
gress said that it would like to see the GATT as a vehicle for the
adoption of international fair labour standards and fair trade practices
which would remove the handicap of low wages paid to foreign labour
and the elimination of unfair trade practices employed in foreign
countries.
In the perspective of the GATT reform provisions (section 121 (a))
and of the debate which preceded the enactment of the 1974 Act,
another aspect of the general design became apparent, It is particularly
visible in the desire expressed in section 121 (a) (4) to achieve "the
adoption of international fair labour standards and of public petition
and confrontation procedures in the GATT "-a postulate which can
hardly be expected to be reached by means of bilateral negotiations.
The usual techniques, frequently resorted to by the U.S. Government,
are the, protection of the labour market by means of tariffs and restric-
tions denying access to goods produced by countries resorting to cheap
labour. This technique cannot be employed in a world economic sys-
tem as it stands today. The only method reasonably available is a
gradual adoption of new standards through the process of economic
integration on a world-wide scale.
Title I authorises the President to negotiate .new conditions and
rules of international trade and at the same time amends U.S. foreign
trade legislation as regards the mechanism, to be applied to foreign
trade management in the United States.
The Act still maintains the fiction that American foreign trade con-
ditions are a matter of bilateral negotiation, which will yield con-
cessions for American exports in other countries. 84 Reform of the
GATT and its code of international trade is a separate problem calling
for a separate approach."' In fact, GATT .is an all-embracing trade
agreement which replaced most, if not all, of the bilateral agreements
made by the United States with individual countries. Trade concessions
84 S. 105.
,85 s. 121.
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negotiated by the United States in individual bilateral agreements are
now replaced (for the most part) by the schedules attached to the
General Agreement. The Act would have gained in clarity if the nego-
tiating authority had dealt primarily with negotiating GATT changes
and reform of the code of international trade at which it clearly aims
(see s. 2 of the Act and passim). It is clear from the circumstances of
the Act that its main purpose was to set up the level of concessions
the United States delegation to the Tokyo Round would be authorised
to make, and this was the purpose of the legislative proposal sub-
mitted in 1973 by the Nixon Administration. Its main thrust, as regards
the removal of trade barriers, was to negotiate the removal of non-
tariff obstacles to trade, offering as a quid pro quo the removal of the
American Selling Price (ASP) for the purpose of duty valuation.8 6
Parallel to the removal of trade barriers, the purpose of the Act is
to restrict, if not to replace altogether, unilateral action to solve
imbalances in trade by the GATT members. This is to be done by
consultation, agreed adjustment or third party adjudication. A typical
example of such action which is aimed at here is the case of the U.S.
dairy product restrictions, imposed under the Defence Production Act
of 1950, which has caused considerable difficulty with U.S. trade
partners.8 It is not quite clear how far the U.S. Congress would go
in accepting that aspect of the GATT reform, as it would result in
considerable restriction of its power to regulate foreign commerce,
but formal authorisation to negotiate a dispute settling is granted."
In spite of the fact that tariff reduction negotiations have been
actively pursued since 1934, tariff reductions remain the most impor-
tant incentive to the expansion of trade and the Act grants the
President considerable powers in this area for the next five-year
period, including the authority to reduce rates to 40 per cent. of those
in force on January 1, 1975. Rates of duty of no more than 5 per cent.
ad valorem are exempt. The President has power to increase U.S.
tariffs, as a result of negotiations, but such increases cannot exceed
50 per cent. of the rate in force on January 1, 1975. No rate of 20
per cent. ad valorem may be increased.89
The Act adopted three approaches to tariff concessions: those
granted on the basis of equality,"0 those extended to developing
countries on the basis of preferences,91 and those made to assure
equitable access to supplies.9 Each of these classes of agreement
would call for a different combination of mutual concessions, depend-
ing upon the needs and interests of the countries involved. At the
s8 ss. 102 and 103'(g) (1). Cf. Dam., n. 77, at pp. 190-192.
87 Hudec, n. 73, at pp. 165 et seq.
88 s. 121 (a) (9).
89 s. 101. 90 s. 105.
91 s. 106. 92 s. 108.
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same time, section 107 urges that trade agreements made by the
U.S. with its partners should provide for internationally agreed rules
and procedures providing for the use of temporary measures to ease
the adjustment of internal markets to the expanded flow of trade,
attributable to the removal or reduction of trade barriers. Such agree-
ments should provide for proper notifications of exporting countries,
consultations, joint reviews of the flow of trade, making proper
adjustments and mediation of disputes.
Section 102 of the Act speaks of the non-tariff barriers and other
distortions of trade, without defining them closely. More specific
examples of them may be found in section 121 of the Act which deals
with the GATT revision.
Obstacles to the sale of American products abroad fall into two
classes.
To the first belong various measures which give advantage to goods
either coming from special areas (e.g. preferences in the case of Com-
monwealth countries) 93 and tax or duty devices which lower the price
of exported commodities. One example of such a measure is the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy of the EEC. Another is value added tax, a
turnover tax which is not levied on goods exported abroad and which
are therefore sold there at lower prices than in EEC markets. Value
added tax (an indirect tax) performs the same function in the EEC as
taxes on a manufacturer's profits (direct tax) and therefore discrimi-
nates against American manufacturers and places a handicap on
American exports. At the same time GATT article XVI prohibits :any
form of direct subsidising of exports and this is interpreted as a pro-
hibition on the remission of direct taxes to subsidise exports. However,
the remission of value added tax is not considered a subsidy.
94
To the second class of obstacles to the sale of American products
abroad belong measures of a social nature such as "fair labour stan-
dards" which cannot be settled through the mechanisms of inter-
national trade agreements, although low wages may favour exports
and disadvantage countries offering high living standards to their
workers.
The general programme of trade liberalisation and harmonisation of
the international trade code is combined with an effort to regularise
procedures dealing with those situations where trade restriction is
necessary in order to counteract the adverse effect of increased -imports
on the economy of the trading partners. The specific example of such
a situation arises where the balance of payments is disturbed by the
imports. While the Act recognises that the interested State must reserve
93 s. 121 (a) (10). Cf. Gibson, n. 80, at pp. 565-568. Cf. Dam, n. 70 at pp. 121-
124, 140.
94 s. 121 (a) (5).
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to itself freedom of action, nevertheless it expressed a desire to have
this freedom exercised with moderation on two specific occasions. Of
the two alternative techniques open to the interested party-a sur-
charge and a quota restriction-section 121 (a) (6) lays down that a
surcharge is -the preferred method "by which industrial countries may
handle balance-of-payments deficits in so far as import restraint
measures are required." The provisions of section 121 (a) (6) are
aimed specifically at article XII of the GATT which deals with this
situation.
Section 122 (balance of payments) still, however, uses both tech-
niques of import restriction (import quotas and the surcharge). Resort
to these methods is permitted in two situations: first, when there is a
serious balance of payments problem and it is necessary to prevent an
imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar; and secondly, in
order to correct an international balance of payments disequilibrium,
even when the American dollar is not threatened. The use of quotas
(quantitative restrictions) is reserved only to the case where the use of
quotas has been agreed to in an international trade agreement and the
problem cannot be corrected by a surcharge.05
In a reverse situation, when the U.S. balance of payments is likely
to show constant and persistent surplus, or considerable appreciation
in the value of the dollar on foreign markets is imminent, the President
may encourage imports by lowering custom duties, but by no more
than 5 per cent. ad valorem. Another measure authorised by the Act
is to increase the value of imported articles or temporarily lift restric-
tions on imports. However, this does not apply in a situation where
restriction on the importation of such articles would materially injure
firms or workers or endanger national security or otherwise affect the
national interest adversely.96
Surcharges or quotas may be imposed by the President for a period
of no longer than 150 days, but this may be extended by Congress. 7
The Act strongly suggests that the U.S. should make agreements with
its partners, that surcharge duties should only be used, and that adjust-
ment liabilities should be shared between the surplus and deficit
countries. As a rule, all import controlling measures should apply to all
countries without discrimination, except in those exceptional cases
'when the purpose of balance of payments control may be achieved by
action against one or more countries with persistent balance of pay-
ments surpluses. In such cases, other countries may be exempt from
import restriction measures. 8
No tariff or non-tariff barrier may be reduced or removed, if the
interests of national security come into play.
95 s. 122 (a) and (b).97 s. 122 (c). 96 s. 122 (c).98 s. 122 (d) (2).
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The general tenor of directives to the Administration is to replace
unilateral decisions to protect the balance of payments, national
security or the welfare of social groups, firms or communities by
previously agreed procedures.
To balance the authority of the Administration to proceed unilat-
erally in order to protect the American balance of payments, the Act
authorises the Administration to compensate possible losses ,to Ameri-
can trading partners.9
Two methods of action are open to the Administration. In the first
place, the President may negotiate additional concessions, with partners
whose trade may be hurt by escape clause measures. In the second
place, the President may unilaterally make such concessions, by
reducing tariff rates even below the maximum reduction generally
provided for in section 101, or below the rate appropriate to any stage
of the process of reduction. The reduced rates may not be less than 70
per cent. of the permissible lowest rates and not more than 30 per cent.
of such duty at each stage.100
Section 123 (Compensation Authority) follows the pattern outlined
by the General Agreement (articles XII and XIX). The emphasis is on
agreed action. All emergency measures to prevent or correct damage
to balance of payments, or to avoid damage to the national economy,
or to avoid adverse effects of increased imports on specific classes of
commodities, are to be the result of consultations and negotiations and
should provide for compensatory concessions.
In order to give a full presentation of -the general drift of the pro-
visions of the 1974 Act in situations in which some restriction of the
flow of imports may be necessary (whether within or without the pro-
jected reform of the GATT) section 107 of the Act (International Safe-
guard Procedure) must be referred to. It states that the purpose of the
Act is to negotiate international agreements which-
in the context of the harmonisation, reduction, or reduction of barriers to,
and other distortions of international trade, which permit the use of tem-
porary measures to ease adjustment to changes occurring in competitive
conditions in the domestic markets ...
Such agreements may provide for:
(1) notification of affected exporting countries; (2) international consulta-
tions; (3) international review of changes in trade flows; (4) making adjust-
ments in trade flows ... ; and (5) international mediation. In addition such
agreements may exclude mutual compensation, or retaliation and provide
for domestic procedures which may give foreign interests access to internal
procedures undertaken under the escape clause.101
To round up the description and analysis of the provisions of the
1974 Act aimed at authorising the Administration to participate effec-
99 s. 123, Compensation Authority.100 Ibid. 101 Title JI, ss. 201-203, Import Relief.
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tively -in -the Tokyo Round, two more aspects of the 1974 regime of
foreign trade must be mentioned. All actions by the Administration
undertaken in order to protect U.S. interests (balance of payments
and national security) are temporary, and their extension must involve
action by Congress,'02 with all the safeguards of the legislative process.
Secondly, the President has the power to retaliate against any party
which is in violation of its agreed obligations.
Section 126 imposes upon the President the duty to keep a check on
the actual performance of foreign trade partners of the United States,
including their implementation of accepted obligations to grant re-
ciprocal trade concessions (duty-free treatment or removal of other
import restrictions). This applies, in the first place, to major industrial
countries, in the event that any of them fail to make concessions under
the 1974 Act providing for competitive opportunities for the com-
merce of the United States. In such a situation the Act provides that
the President shall recommend to Congress appropriate legislative
action either for the termination of concessions granted under a trade
agreement, or to deny the application to the trade of that country of
legislation enacted for the purpose of implementing a trade agreement.
The term "major industrial country" covers Canada, the European
Economic Community and its members, Japan, and any other foreign
country designated by the President.' 8
Directives addressed to -the Administration to negotiate further
trade concessions and reform the code of international trade were
supplemented by an instruction as to how diplomatic processes should
be utilised to obtain the best results.
The guiding principle of trade negotiation is to proceed on a sec-
toral basis, i.e. to seek trade concessions on an industry-by-industry
basis. According to section 135 the President, before entering into a
trade agreement, shall seek advice from the private sector as regards
negotiating objectives and bargaining positions. He shall consult the
Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations consisting of representa-
tives of government, labour, industry, agriculture, small business, ser-
vice industries, retailers, consumer -interests and the general public.
The President may establish general policy advisory committees for
industry, labour and agriculture, and may create and seek advice from
sector advisory committees representing individual sectors, industry,
labour or agriculture. He may also seek advice from private organisa-
tions. The Act -thus provides for various channels of information and
communication to inform the President on the special problems facing
each sector and industrial or labour interests in connection with nego-
tiations in progress. These committees shall also review and report on
192 See infra text related to nn. 329 et seq. 103 s. 126 (d).
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agreements negotiated by the President or the Congress or the Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations. In sum, the Act assumes that
particular interests are effectively represented in trade negotiations, and
that -their voices are heard.
The same guiding principle is also sustained by section 104 which
insists that negotiation of mutual concessions "be conducted on the
basis of appropriate product sectors of manufacturing." The basic idea
is that mutual trade concessions shall be granted on a sector-by-sector
basis and presumably corresponding industrial sectors are to be treated
on a basis of reciprocity. This understanding is strengthened by the
provisions of subsection (e) of section 104 which states:
For the purposes of this section . .. the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations together with the Secretary of Commerce, Agriculture, or
Labour as appropriate, shall after consultation with the Advisory Commit-
tee for Trade Negotiations established under section 135, and after consul-
tations with interested private organisations, identify appropriate product
sectors of manufacturing.
At the same time, it is clear that the sectoral approach will not
necessarily always be appropriate. For example, one of the problem
sectors in the American economy is agriculture, a sector heavily dis-
criminated against in imports to industrial countries. To overcome
artificial barriers against agricultural exports, section 103 (Overall
Negotiating Objective) visualises that there may have to be departures
from the sector principle in that it provides that "to the maximum
extent feasible," the harmonisation, reduction, or elimination of agri-
cultural trade barriers and distortions shall be undertaken in con-
junction with the harmonisation, reduction, or elimination of industrial
trade barriers and distortions.
Another exception to the sectoral approach is included in section
123 (Compensation Authority) which gives the President the power to
negotiate compensation in the form .of new import concessions to a
country affected by quota restrictions on its products, where this is
necessary, to remedy large and serious balance of payments deficits.
Section 123 suggests that import quota restrictions shall be compen-
sated for by concessions relating to other classes of goods, so as to
maintain an overall balance of trade between the United States and
that other country. Thus while trade concessions are negotiated on a
sectorial basis, the actual progress of the exchange of goods is viewed
from the standpoint of maintaining the overall health of the national
economy.
The sectoral approach is not an American invention. It reflects the
fact that, at this time, the disparity in the competitive position of
imports from various countries, to a large degree depending on the
disparity in national standards of living, prevents a general removal of
26 I.C.L.Q.-3
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trade barriers. Kennedy Round negotiations .were saved because it
was possible, through the sectoral approach, to agree to concessions
affecting sectors rather than the general tariff structure.10 4 It is also on
the basis of the sectoral approach that the Tokyo Round aims at
devising the total removal of trade barriers. The Ministerial Declara-
tion of September 14, 1973, proposed "an examination of the possi-
bilities for the co-ordinated reduction or elimination of all barriers to
trade in selected sectors as a complementary technique." "I
Viewed from a very general point of view, it is clear that on no
account can the 1974 Act be considered as the ultimate model for the
international trade pattern. Rather, it is a stepping-stone towards
liberalised trade among the most important industrial nations, which
recognise that free trade ideals are still a possibility.
This understanding of the 1974 Act is strengthened by the terms of
s.ection 121 (a) (12) which directs the Administration to seek "to
establish within GATT an international agreement on articles (includ-
ing footwear) including the creation of regular and institutionalised
mechanisms for the settlement of disputes and of surveillance body to
monitor all international shipments of such articles."
This authorisation has its history. It has been mentioned before 105a
that some time after its inception the GATT system suffered a serious
breakdown. In 1955, Japan joined the GATT with its low-wage labour
and highly developed industry, ready to flood world markets with its
exports and so threatening serious market disruptions. Later on, Japan
was joined by other competitors, mostly newly developing countries,
which also threatened to invade the markets of the GATT members
with cheap commodities (mainly textiles), causing serious economic
difficulty. The response of GATT members varied. Some of them re-
fused to grant Japan a Most Favoured Nation treatment. Others-
including the United States-forced Japan and textile producers to
agree to voluntary quota restrictions, and *negotiated a Long Term
Textile Agreement.
A full account of these developments is given elsewhere.100 Here it
is sufficient to say that the 1974 Act, with its aim of reforming the
GATT, moved to replace unilateral action on the part of individual
countries by an agreed international process supervised by GATT,
thus legalising in effect a permanent international trade organisation.
Il1. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
To implement the complicated scheme of negotiation and regulation
devised in it, the Trade Act of 1974 provides for a precise interplay
104 Dam, n. 70, at pp. 77-78. 105 N. 81.
105a Ci. supra, text related to nn. pp. 63-71.
106 Dam, n. 70, at pp: 296-315; Hudec, n. 73, at pp. 212-215.
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between the major functionaries whose actions-pursuant to guidelines
established by the Act itself-determine the desired foreign trade
policy of the United States. These major functionaries are: the Presi-
dent, Congress, the International Trade Commission (the " revised"
Tariff Commission), the Office of the Special Representative for Trade,
Negotiations, the Secretaries of Labour, Commerce, and the Treasury,
and the various advisory and co-ordinating committees established
under the Act.
The President
The Chief Executive is the prime mover in effectuating the negotiatory
objectives promulgated under Titles I and IV of the Act. The President
is empowered by the Act to enter into five basic types of trade agree-
ment: trade agreements aimed at eliminating tariff barriers,10 7 trade
agreements aimed'at eliminating non-tariff barriers and similar distor-
tions 108; trade agreements aimed at effecting General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) revisions 109; limited commercial agreements
extending non-discriminatory (MFN) treatment to countries previously
denied such treatment 110; and orderly marketing agreements 111 (alone
or in combination with other, unilateral actions) 112 to provide relief
from injury-or -the threat thereof-caused by import competition." 3
The section 101, 102, 405, and 203 agreements may be characterised
as permissive 114; the section 121 agreements are mandatory. 11 Presi-
dential authority for effectuating section 101 and 102 agreements is
limited to five years from the date of the enactment of the Act," 6
although the section 101 authority may be extended for an additional
107 S. 101. 108 s. 102.
109 s. 121. At least one commentator has suggested that the s. 101 authority is
granted solely in order to execute the GATT revision mandate outlined in s. 121.
See, e.g. Gibson, n. 87. It would appear, however, that such a restrictive view is
unwarranted. First, while that author's views may have been accurate as regards
H.R. 10710, the law as enacted has been expanded-together with s. 121. Secondly,
subs. (b) of s. 121 may be taken as authorising independent-of s. 101-action by
the President " to establish the principles described in [s. 1211." Thirdly, s. 105
expands the presidential authority under s. 101 to bilateral agreements as well, if they
would prove to be more effective. And, finally, s. 101 is also to be used in connection
with ameliorative compensatory concessions necessitated by the imposition of s. 203
import relief: s. 123 (d).
110 s. 405.
111 s. 203 (a) (4).
112 s. 203 (a) (5). 113 s. 203 (a).
114 " IT~he President ... may enter into trade agreements with foreign countries
or instrumentalities thereof .. " (emphasis added): ss. 101 (a) (1), 102 (b). " [T]he
President may authorise the entry into force of bilateral commercial agreements pro-
viding non-discriminatory treatment .. " (emphasis added): s. 405 (a). While:the
language of s. 203 appears to be mandatory-" ... the President . . . shall . . .
negotiate orderly marketing agreements with foreign countries ... (emphasis added),
any presidential action is predicated on his determination to provide import relief in
the first place: s. 203 (a).
115 " The President shall . .. enter into [trade] agreements with foreign countries
or-instrumentalities: . . ." (emphasis added): s. 121 (b).
116 ss. 101 (a) (1), 102 (b): .
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two years.117 Until their authority terminates, section 101 trade agree-
ments are to be used to grant new concessions by way of ameliorating.
the effects of section 203 import relief "Is; thereafter, section 123 pro-
vides the authority for such ameliorative relief.119 In order to carry out
section 101 trade agreements, the President may manipulate duties
"as .. . required or appropriate." 120
In the case of section 102 trade agreements, the President must,
"not less than 90 days before the day on which he enters into such
trade agreement," notify Congress and promptly thereafter publish
notice in the Federal Register of his intention to enter into such a trade
agreement. He must enter into consultations concerning its implemen-
tation with the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Committee
on Ways and Means, "and with each committee of the House and the
Senate and each joint committee which has jurisdiction over legislation
involving subject-matters which would be affected by such trade agree-
ment." 121 After entering into a section 102 trade agreement, the Presi-
dent must submit to Congress a draft of the implementing Bill and a
statement of any proposed administrative action with explanations
thereof, 22 as well as a statement of how such an agreement "serves
the interests of United States commerce" and why the Bill and
administrative action are "required or appropriate to carry out the
agreement." 121
The President is authori sed to enter into bilateral section 101 and
102 trade agreements if he "determines that ... [such] agreements
will more effectively promote the economic growth of, and full employ-
ment in, the United States . ," 124 If a section 101 or 102 trade agree-
ment will significantly affect "competitive opportunities in one or
more product sectors [of manufacturing] . . . " the President is
required to submit to Congress an analysis of the extent to which the
section 104 "Sector Negotiating Objective" would be achieved by
such an agreement.12 5 In negotiating section 101 or 102 trade agree-
ments, the President must reach certain specified negotiating objec-
tives.' 28 In addition, he is required "from time to time to publish and
furnish the International Trade Commission . . .with lists of articles
117 s. 124 (d). "is s. 123 (d).
19 s. 123 (a).
120 He " ... may proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing
duty, such continuance of duty-free or excise treatment, or such additional duties
* . .": s. 101 (a) (2). . 121 s. 102 (c).
122 s. 102 (e) (2) (A). 122 s. 102 (e) (2) (B).
124 s. 105. 121 s. 104 (a).
126 s. 101 and 102 objectives: " Overall Negotiating Objective": (" obtain more
open and equitable market access and the harmonisation, reduction, or elimination
of devices which distort trade or commerce "), s. 103; "Sector 'Negotiating
Objective ": s. 104; " Agreements with Developing Countries": s. 106. S. 102 only
objectives: " International Safeguard Procedures ": s. 107; "Access to Supplies
I' Important to the Econojmic Requirement of the United States '] ": s. 108.
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which may be considered for... 127 section 101 trade agreement nego-
tiational purposes." 128 Before making an.offer with respect to such
trade agreements, the President must have sought 129 and received
the advice of the International Trade Commission (ITC), unless the.
ITC has failed to respond within the statutorily imposed time limit.18 0
Moreover, before making an offer with respect to either a section 101
or 102 trade agreement, the President is required to have afforded a
public hearing to interested parties and to have received-and appar-
ently reviewed-a summary thereof.' 2 '
Whenever the implementation of a section 101 trade agreement
requires a reduction in duty in excess of ten per cent. of the previous
rate, the President is required to implement the reduction by
"staging" it at one-year intervals.'2 2 He is authorised to exceed the.
relevant per-year limit 13 only for the purpose of "rounding" to
" simplify the computation." 134 There is a ten-year staging period
limit.13'
In negotiating section 121 trade agreements, the President is required
to promote "the development of an open, non-discriminatory, and fair
world economic system." 120 Twelve trade liberalising "principles"
are specifically outlined in the Act,' 37 but from the directive it is clear,
that action should not be limited to those specified principles only.188
The authority extended by section 121 is really two-fold: the Presi-
dent is required to conform to existing GATT agreements within the
trade liberalising principles, 1 9 and, "to the extent feasible," to enter
into new agreements guided by the same principles. 140 Whenever the
implementation of a trade agreement entered into pursuant to this sec-
tion would effect a change in any provision of federal law or adminis-
trative procedure, the agreement must be submitted to Congress so that
it may pass implementing legislation, unless Congress explicitly dele-
gates such implementing authority.' 4 '
Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 begins with a general prohibition
against extending non-discriminatory (MFN) treatment to countries
which had not previously qualified for such treatment.' 4 2 It then sets
out specific categories of non-market economy countries which are
127 s. 131 (a).
128 This also concerns s. 123 and 124 trade agreements.
129 S. 131 (b).
120 s. 134.
131 ss. 133 (a) (b), 134.
132 s. 109 (a).
13 s. 109 (a) (1).
124 s. 109 (b).
185 s. 109 (c) (1).
128 s. 121 (a).
137 S. 121 (a) (1)-(a) (12). 228 s. 121 (a).
139 Ibid.. 140 s. 121 (b).
141 s. 121 (c). 142 s. 401.
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ineligible for the extension of MFN treatment. 143 However, these pro-
hibitions are replete with exculpatory provisions. For example, they
all apply prospectively, and not retrospectively, so that no country,
already enjoying MFN treatment would be denied such a preference 144;
the proscriptions merely enjoin the President from providing new con-
cessions to this class of non-market economy countries. 145 But even
new concessions are not totally denied to countries burdened by sec-
tions 402 and 409 prohibitions. 14 Should the President decide that a
non-market economy country affected by these prohibitions has imple-
mented legislation which would substantiate a finding that it had
"mended its ways," he is empowered to enter into commercial agree-
ments with such a country, impeded only by the requirement that he
must submit a report to Congress delineating the change of circum-
stances, both at the outset of the agreement and at six-month intervals
thereafter 146a The only risk factor is that Congress-by adopting a
disapproval resolution in either House within 90 days of the submis-
sion of the report 147-may not only render the commercial agreement
thus entered into by the President void, but may preclude his entering
into any future agreements "with such country under . . . title
[IV]. -. " 14. apparently for the duration of the Act.
In addition, " [d]uring the 18-month period beginning on the date
of the enactment of this Act, the President is authorised to waive by
Executive order the application of" section 402 (a) 149 and 409 (a) 150
prohibitions, thereby circumventing :the risk 151 of proceeding under
section 402 (b) or 409 (b) merely by submittiig a ,report to Congress 152
which asserts that ". . . he has determined that such waiver will sub-
stantially promote -the objectives of this section . . ." '13 and that
"... he has received -assurances that the emigration practices of that
country will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the
objective of this section." 154 The waiver would, of course, free the
President to exercise his authority Under section 405 to enter into a
bilateral commercial agreement with that country.
143 s. 402. (a) '(countries which deny or impose economic restrictions on emigra-
tion); s. 403 (a) (countries which do not co-operate with the U.S. in resolving the
issue of personnel missing in action in Southeast Asia) s. 409 (a) (countries which
deny or impose economic restrictions on their citizens who wish to emigrate to join
a " very close " relative in the United States).
144 ss. 402 (a), 403 (b), 409 (c).
'-5 See e.g. s. 402 (a): " ... the President of the United States shall not conclude
any commercial agreement with any such country.
146 ss. 402 (b), 409 (b), & 402 (c).
146a ss. 402 (b), 409 (b).
147 s. 407 (c) (3).
148 s. '407 (c) (3) (C).
149 s. 402 (c) (1).
150,s. 409 (d).
'151 See supra, text related to nn. 62-65. 162 s. 402' (c) (I).
'15a s. 402 (c) (1) (A). 154 s. 402 (c) (1) (B).
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Waiver authority seems a somewhat superfluous safeguard. It does
not grant any independent affirmative action authorisation beyond
waiving the proscriptions of section 402 (a) and 402 (b). In othero
words, should the President wish to accomplish any. extension of MFN
treatment to a country absolutely denying or imposing economic
restrictions on emigration, he would still have to conclude a commer-.
cial agreement with that country 155-an agreement which would take
effect only if approved by Congress. 15 6 Notwithstanding this safeguard
mechanism, Congress saw fit to promulgate a complicated scheme for
subsequent 12-month extensions of waiver authority. 157 This, in effect,
states that, following the initial 18-month waiver period, the President
may extend waiver authority for any number" of successive 12-month
periods, provided that the conditions for the initial grant of waiver
persist and neither House of Congress has succeeded in blocking the
extension by adopting a resolution disapproving it within the statu-
torily mandated period(s).55
In any event, the President may authorise "the entry into force of
bilateral commercial agreements providing non-discriminatory treat-
ment to the products of countries heretofore denied such treat-
ment . .. " 15 and "by proclamation extend [such] treatment to the
products of a foreign country 160 which. has entered into [such] a
bilateral commercial agreement. :. ." 161 The President is empowered
"at any time [to] suspend or withdraw' any extension of non-discrimi-
natory treatment . .. " unilaterally and without the consent, approval,
or right to disapproval of Congress. 112 The type of agreement into
which -the President may enter under the provisions of section 405 is
restricted as to parties,'62 and term,'14 and by the mandatory inclusion
of various safeguard conditions. " ', Whenever the President takes action
155 ss. 404, 405. . 156 405 (c) (1).
157 s. 405 (d) (l)-(d) (5).
15s Eighteen months, s. 402 (d) (2) (B), plus 60 days, s. 402 (d) (3) (A), plus 45
days, s. 402, (d) (4), in the case of the first extension, and twelve-months plus 60
days, s. 402 (d) (5), in the case of succeeding twelve-month periods.
'59 s. 405 (a). I
'60 It may be emphasised that the s. 404 and 405 authority extends to all foreign
countries, and, as to the countries not characterised as non-market economies
practicing discrimination in emigration, the s. 402 (c) & (d) waiver provisions do
not apply. That does not, however, mean that this grant of general authority is
unencumbered, see infra, nn. 88-90.
161 s. 404 (a). 162 S. '404 (c).
163 The agreement must be a bilateral agreement, s. "405 (b).
164 The agreement is limited to a 3-year initial period, but is renewable for
additional 3-year periods, s. 405 (b) (1), if the country has exhibited " good faiths"
performance of its obligations, see s. 405 (b) (1) (A) & (B).
165 Suspension or termination for national security reasons, s. 405 (b) (2); con-
sultative, s. 405 (b) (4) (A), and remedial, s. 405 (b) (3) (B), safeguards to prevent
market disruption; protection of industrial intellectual property rights for patents
and trade marks, s. 405 (b) (4); copyrights, s. 405 (b) (5); and trade secrets, s. 405
(b) (6); dispute settlement mechanism, s. 405 (b) (7); promotion of trade, s. 405 (b)
(8); ongoing assessment machinery, s. 405 (b) (9) and any " other arrangements,,of.
a commercial nature as will promote the purposes of this Act," s. 405 (b) (10).
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under section 404 (a), he must "promptly" transmit to Congress the
proclamation, the agreement, and his reasons for so acting. 66 Con-
gress may then approve 167 or disapprove-in the case of agreements
"entered into before the date of the enactment of this Act. ... " 16"
Finally, the President is authorised to "negotiate orderly marketing
agreements" 16 5-alone or in combination with other forms of import
relief 170,, limiting the export from foreign countries and the import
into the United States of [certain] articles" 171 in order "to prevent or
remedy serious injury or the threat thereof to [an] industry ... and to
facilitate the orderly adjustment to new competitive conditions by the
industry in question .... ,, 172 It should be mentioned here that the
whole panoply of Title H import relief measures may be brought into
operation by entirely fair, non-discriminatory, and non-restrictive trade
practices which are, unfortunately, successful enough to injure
seriously or threaten so to injure a "domestic industry producing an
article like or directly competitive with [the] imported article . 173
In contradistinction, Title III relief is available only pursuant to a
determination of unfair, unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory
trade practices,14 and here the element of competition with a domestic
producer is, largely, irrelevant. Moreover, while the initiative for taking
action under Titles I, ILL, IV, and V rests, for the most part, with the
President,'1 75 the preferred initiative for affording Title II import relief
is from "an entity . . which is representative of [the] industry ,.."
alleging a need thereof.' 7 6 The President, 77 as well as other officials
and agencies' 78 are not, however, precluded from "casting the first
stone," in the unlikely eventuality of there being severe import com-
petition and no outcry from the industry concerned.
In determining whether or not to apply the forms of import relief
for which he is responsible,7 9 the President may negotiate a trade
agreement to limit the import into the United States of the offending
166 s. 407 (a). 167 s. 407 (c) (1).
16s s. 407 (c) (2). . 189 s. 203 (a) (4).
170 s. 203 (a) (5). 171 s. 203 (a) (4).
172 s. 203 (a). 173 Defined, s. 201 (b) (3).
'74 See ger~erally s. 301.
175 See generally ss. 101, 102, 121, 301, 404, 405 and 501.
176 See s. 201, in particular, s. 201 (a) (1). '77 s. '201 (b) (1).
1748 Ibid. Included are the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the
Committee on Ways and Means (House) and Finance (Senate) and .the ITC.
179 The criteria for presidential action with respect to import relief occasioned
by competition are the same regardless of whether the relief is a s. 203 (4) trade
agreement or some form of direct import manipulation-which will be 'discussed
more fully in the following paragraphs. For that reason, s. 203 (4) trade agreements
were treated last as they provided a perfect transition from the discussion of the
Presidential trade agreement authority to his other, more unilateral, authorities:
Since the criteria will be examined here, they will not be repeated later, and the
feader is reminded that, although the focus is on trade agreements, the same pro-
visions apply to all the forms envisioned-as part and parcel of s. 203 relief. The
discussion .of. the other fornis of relief pursuant to this section will, therefore
merely refer back to this tieatment of the issues.
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competitive article.18 0 Even after receiving a report. containing an
affirmative. finding by the -ITC, under section 201 (b), to the effect
"that increased imports have been a substantial cause of serious injury
or .ihe threat thereof with respect to an industry," the President may
refuse to take action as long as "he determines that provision of such
relief is not in the national economic interest of the United
States . .. " 18,1 However, he must thereupon report his reasons for so
deciding to Congress 182 and risk being overruled.1 8
Trade agreements may be negotiated after the imposition of other
forms of import relief, in which case they could replace such relief,
8 4
in whole or in part, or they may be negotiated as preliminary steps in
the provision of other forms of import relief.' In negotiating section
203 (4) trade agreements, the President must operate within the general
premises of the abuses this import relief mechanism was designed to
preclude, namely serious injury or threat of serious injury due to
increased imports of competing articles.18 0 The trade agreement, there-
fore, should not require a decrease in imports below ". . . the quantity
or value* of such article imported into the United States during the
most recent period which . . . is representative of imports of such
article." 187 In order to carry out such trade agreements, the President
may issue regulations concerning withdrawal from warehouse stocks
of articles covered by the agreement.' The trade agreements nego-
tiated pursuant to this section are restricted as to their term, 80 but are
renewable.' Import relief which is to be provided for more than
three years must "to the extent feasible" be phased down gradually,
with the first reduction occurring no later than the first day of the
fourth year in which relief will be prcivided.'91
In addition to the* authority to enter into trade agreements, the
President is empowered by the Trade Act of 1974 to proclaim by
executive order four types of unilateral, import-manipulative devices:
relief from injury caused by import competition 152; relief from unfair
trade practices 113; temporary relief from balance-of-payments dis-
equilibria 194; and duty-free preferences.19
180 s. 203 (a) (4).
181 s. 202 (a) (1) (A). See also sec. 202 (c) (l)-(a) (factors to consider pertaining
to " national economic interest ").
182 s. 203 (b) (2).
l8 s. '203 (c). In which case the action recommende'd by the ITC shall take
effect, ibid.
184 s. 203 (e) (2). Cf. also s. 203 (a) (4) and (5). .
185 s. 203 (e) (1) & (e) (3).
186 See s. 201 (b) (1) (emphasis added).
187 s. 203 (d) (2).
188 s. 203 (g) (2).
189 s. 203 (h) (1) (five years from taking effect).
190 s. 203 (h) (3) (one 3-year period). 191 s. ,20 3 (y) (2).
192 s. 203 (a)'(l)-(a) (3) & (a) (5). q "'- !s. 301(a).
194 s. 122.1. 5s. 501.
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The first of these, relief from injury caused by import competition,
is basically the same authority allowing the President to conduct the
last type of trade agreements examined earlier. 190 The authority com-
mences with an affirmative finding by the ITC "that increased imports
have been a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof with
respect to an industry. . . ." 177 Thereupon, the President may 198 pro-
vide four types of relief (excluding the trade agreements discussed
earlier): (a) increase or imposition of a duty 199; (b) imposition of a
tariff-rate quota 200; (c) modification or imposition of a quantitative
restriction 201; or "any combination of 'such actions," including and
in conjunction with a trade agreement. 20 2 The President, if he intends
to proclaim such relief, must act promptly.20 3 All the provisions
already enumerated with respect to section 203 (a) (4) trade agree-
ments apply to the other forms of relief also.20 4
The President is also empowered to take affirmative action to pro-
vide relief from unfair trade practices, 205 defined as (a) tariff or other
import restrictions 200; (b) discriminatory or otherwise unjustifiable or
unreasonable acts or policies 207; (c) subsidies 201; or (d) unjustifiable
or unreasonable restrictions on access to critical supplies. 209 In making
his determination, the President is instructed to assess the relationship
of his action to the purposes of the Act 2 10 namely, to remove impedi-
ments which burden or restrict United States commerce, with respect
to tariff /import restrictions2 11 discriminatory acts/policies2 12 and
restrictions on access to critical supplies. 212 With respect to subsidies,
he is enjoined to consider also (i) whether the Secretary of the
Treasury has found that subsidies are being provided 214; (ii) whether
the ITC has found a substantial effect on competitive U.S: pro-
duct(s) 215; and (iii) whether ".A..the Antidumping Act 1921, and sec-
tion 303 of the Tariff Act -of 1930 are inadequate to deter such prac-
'196 See text supra, related to nn. 94-118.
197 s. 202 (a). For definitions of the various elements of this multifaceted test,
see s. 201 (b) (l)-(b) (6).
198 The permissive nature of this authority is. explained at n. 24, supra. A'more
complete treatment of the entire "presidential determination " process is contained
in nn. 104-110, supra, and the corresponding text.
199 s. 203 (a) (1).
200 s. 203 '(a) (2).
201 s. 203 (a) (3).
202 s. 203 (a) (5).
203 's. 203' (e) (1) (" within 15 days after'the import relief determination date ").
204 Except, of course, those specifically reserved. See supra, text related to nn.
94-118.
206 s. 301.
206 s. 301 (a) (1).
207 s. 301 (a) (2).
2 08 s. 301 (a) (3).
209 s. 301 (a) (4).
210.,S. '301 (N). 211 's. 301 (a) (1).
212 s. 301 (a) (2). z's s. 301 (a) (4).
214 s. 301 (c) (1). 215 s. 301. (c) (2).
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tices." 216 Before taking action, the President is required. to "provide
an opportunity for ,the presentation. of. views " 217 and provide for
public hearings at the request of any, interested, person, 218 unless
"expeditious action" in line with '"'national interest" require other-
wise, 21 9 in which case the presentation of views and hearings may be
postponed until after action is taken. 220 Having made the above deter-
minations and -having provided for (or legitimately postponed) the
presentation of views and hearings, the President may negate the appli-
cation or benefits of trade agreements 221; impose duties, fees or other
restrictions 222; and "take all appropriate, and feasible steps . . to
obtain the elimination of such restrictions or subsidies . ," 223
Under "balance-of-payments authority" 224 the President is author-
ised 225 to proclaim temporary:226 import surcharges 227 or quota
limitations, 28 or both,229 "[w]henever fundamental international pay-
ments problems require special import measures" 2 10 to correct .U.S.
balance-of-payments deficits, 2 1 U.S. dollar depreciations, 232 or inter-
national balance-of-payments disequilibria. 233 The President is also
authorised to act to prevent "fundamental international payments
problems" favourable to the United States. 2 4 However, he may cor-
rect only. U.S. balance-of-trade surpluses 235 or U.S. dollar apprecia-
tions 236 and then only by proclaiming temporary 217 reductions in the
relevant rate of duty,238 in conjunction with quota increases. 2 9 The
216 s. 301 (c) (3). 217 S. 301 (d) (1).
218 s. 301 (e) (2) (emphasis added).
219 s. 301 (e).
220 Ibid.
221 s. 301 (a) (A).
222 s. 301 (a) (B).
223 s. 301 (a).
224 S. 122.
225 It is interesting to note that the language of s. 122 (a) (balance-of-payments
deficits and dollar depreciation) is mandatory (". , . the President shall proclaim
) but the standard " contrary to the national interest " (not even " national
economic interest "-this may be significant) exception is available, s. 122 (b), i.e.
itL is really permissive. But the language of s. 122 (c) (balance-of-payments -surpluses
and dollar appreciation) is permissive (" ... the President is authorised to pro-
claim ...") while the " national interest "-and a few other-exceptions are manda-
tory, s. 122 (c).
226 " [Nlot exceeding 150 days (unless such period is extended by Act, of Con-
gress) .... ," s. 122 (a), and substantially the same, " ... for a period of, 150 days
(unless such period is extended by Act of Congress) .... " s. 122 (c).
227 s. 122 (a) (A).
228 S. 122 (a) (B). 229 s. 122 (a> (C).
230 s. 122 (a). 281 s, 122 (a) (I).
232 S. 122 (a) (2). 233 s. 122 (a) (3).
234 s. 122 (c). 235 s. 122 (c) (1).
236 s. 122 (c) (2). 287 See supra, n.- 440.
238 s. 122 (c) (A). It is interesting to note that the level of relief-via import sur-
charge-available to cure unfavourable (to the U.S.) world market fluctuations is
up to and including 15 per cent. ad valorem, s. 122 (a) (A), while the level of
relief-via duty reduction-available to cure favourable (to the U.S.) world, market
fluctuations is only up to and including 5 per cent. ad valorem. .
2 9 s. 122 (c), (B).
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Act allows the President to "suspend, modify, or terminate, in whole
or in part, any proclamation under this section . . ." at any time. 240
Finally, the President is authorised to provide, for a period not
exceeding ten years, 241 duty-free treatment 242 to certain classes of
articles 243 from certain classes of countries, designated " beneficiary
developing countries." 244 Subsequently, the President may withdraw,
suspend, or modify such preferential treatment, 245 but, by so doing,
cannot establish a rate of duty "... . other than the rate which would
apply.. ." under ordinary circumstances. 240 The President is required
to withdraw or suspend the "beneficiary developing country " designa-
tion 247 upon -the occurrence of specified changed circumstances, 248
with certain exceptions.249
In taking any form of action under the Act, the President is
authorised to: (a) terminate, in whole or -in part at any time, any pro-
clamation made under the Act 210; (b) withdraw, suspend, or modify
trade agreements and increase duties in retaliation for a unilateral
withdrawal, suspension, or modification of trade agreement obligations
by a foreign country or instrumentality, without granting adequate
compensation 211; (c) recommend to Congress termination or denial of
trade agreement benefits to any "major industrial country" which has
failed to reciprocate with substantially equivalent concessions 252; and
(d) to reserve from negotiations articles critical to national security 253
and certain other articles. 254
The President is also responsible for appointing the Special Repre-
sentative for Trade Negotiations 25 and his two Deputies, 256 as well as
the Commissioners of the ITC.267 The Act requires the Chief Execu-
tive to establish an Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations 258
In addition, he may, if necessary, establish general industry, labour,
and agriculture policy advisory committees 259 and sector' advisory
committees. 20
240 Both during the initial 150-day period and during subsequent extension
periods, if applicable. s. 122 (g).
2141 s. 505 (a).
242 s. 501.
245 s. 503.
244 s. 502.
245 s. 504 (a).
246 Ibid.: i.e. cannot use this title for unauthorised duty manipulations.
' 247' S. 504 (b).
248 s. 504 (c) (1) (A) & (c) (1) (B).
249 s. 504 (c) (1) (i)-(c) (1) (iii), (d) & (e).
250 s. 125 (b).
05, s. .125,'(c) and " (d).
'252 s. 126.
253 s., 126 (a).
254 s. 126 (b).
255 s. 141 (b) (1). 256 s.' 141 (b) (2)
257 s. 172 (a). 258 S: 135 (b) (1).
.259 s. 135 (c) (1). 260 s. 135 (c) (2).
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The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations heads the Office of
the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 261 within the Execu-
tive Office of the President.262 His primary function is that of chief
representative 263 of the U.S. for trade negotiations under Title I (sec-
tions 101, 102, 121) and section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.64 He
is also responsible for advising the President and Congress with respect
to matters related to -the trade agreements programmes 263 and for
chairing the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations. 26  The
Deputy Special Representatives for Trade Negotiations, of whom
there are two,2 1 7 function primarily in conducting trade negotiations 268
under the Act and assisting the Special Representative. 2 9 One Deputy
Special Representative is responsible for chairing the Adjustment
Assistance Co-ordinating Committee. 270
The Special Representative may initiate, on his own authority, sec-
tion 201 (import competition) 271 and section 406 (market disruption
by a Communist country)' 272 investigations by the ITC. He is also
responsible for conducting the reviews and public hearings concerning
unfair trade practices 273 and (in concert with the Secretary of Com-
merce, Agriculture, or Labour and after consultation with the Advisory
Committee for Trade Negotiations) for identifying "appropriate pro-
duct sectors of manufacturing" to be considered in achieving the
"sector negotiating objective " of section 101 and 102 trade agree-
ments. 274 Being under the direct control of the President, the Special
Negotiator is, of course, "responsible for such other functions as the
President may direct." 275
The United States International Trade Commission
The ITC is the United States Tariff Commission renamed.2 7 The six
commissioners are the President's appointees, 277 and they serve, at his
discretion, for nine-year terms. Their voting record is a matter of pub-
lic record,27 and they may be represented in judicial proceedings by
261 s. 141 (b) (1).
262 s. 141 (a).
263 For which purpose he holds the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-
potentiary, s. 141 (b) (1).
264 s. 141, (c) (1) (A).
265 s. 141 (c) (1) (C).
266 s. 135 (b) (2).
267 s. 141 (b) (2).
-6 For which purpose they hold the rank of Ambassador, ibid.
269 s. 141 (c) (2).
270 s. 281.
271 s. 201 (b) (1).
272 406 (a) (1). 273 s. 301 (d) (2).
274 s. 104 (c). 275 s. 141 (c) (1) (F).
276 s. 171 (a). 277 s. 172 (a).
278 s. 173.
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their own staff attorneys or by the Attorney-General of the United
States. 279 Like the Special Representative,28 ° they perform both in
advisory and affirmative capacities; however, while the Special Rep-
resentative's primary affirmative capacity is negotiational, the ITC per-
forms essentially investigative and decisional (adjudicatory) functions.
I In its advisory- capacity, the ITC is responsible for conducting
various types of investigation, 281 as well as for holding public hear-
ings 282 and advising the President as to the probable economic impact
on domestic industries 282 and consumers 284 of any proposed section
101, 123 or 124 285 or 102 trade agreements.286 The ITC also advises
the President on the probable domestic economic impact of extensions
of duty-free preferences with respect to certain articles from specified
beneficiary countries,2 8 and may, if requested to do so, advise the
President on the extension, reduction, or termination of section 203
import relief.288
Besides rendering purely advisory recommendations, the ITC is
directed by. the 1974 Act to conduct certain types of investigations
and render more binding recommendations, including an independent
affirmative action, pursuant to Titles 11,28 9 111,290 and IV 291 of the Act.
Under Title II,the ITC is required to conduct an investigation 292 and
make a determination "whether an article is being imported into the
United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause
of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry pro-
ducing an article like or directly competitive with the imported
article." 293 It must, in turn, report to the President its findings, the
basis therefor, and its recommendations, including dissenting or
separate views. 294 A similar provision pertains to market disruption by
a Communist country. 2 6 While the President is impowered to dis-
regard an affirmative finding by the ITC of injury caused by import
competition, 296 he cannot provide such relief unless he receives such
279 s. 174.
280 See, supra, text related to nn. 188-202.
281 s. 131 (e).
282 Including labour, agriculture, mining, fishing, and manufacturing, s. 131 (b).
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid. 285 s. 131 (c).
286 s. 503 (a). 287 s. 203 (i) (2).
289 Under s. 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by 9. 341 (a) of the Trade
Act of 1974, the ITC is empowered to investigate alleged unfair import practices
and, upon finding a violation, exclude the offending articles from entry, pe'mit entry
only upon the posting of a bond, or issue cease and desist orders to enjoin further
violations. The Piresident may, apparently for 'any reason, disapprove the Com-
mission's action in which case it shall have no force.
289 s. 201.
290 ss. 321 (a), 331 (a) and 341 (a). 291 s. 405 (a) (1).
* 292'Based on certain specified criteria: see s. 201 (b) (2)-(b) (6) and (c).
* 293 s. 201 (b) (1).
294 s. 201 (d) (1).
295 See s. 406 (a) (1). 296 See, supra, text related to nn. 94-102 and 117.
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an affirmative determination by the ITC.291 Moreover, the commence-
ment of an investigation by the ITC under section 201 invokes action
on the part of the Secretary of Labour with respect to adjustment
assistance. 2 8
Pursuant to authority granted under Title III of the Act,200 the ITC
is required to investigate 'allegations of unfair -trade practices with
respect to the levying of anti-dumping duties,3 0 0  contervailing
duties,301 and unfair import competition 302 and to make determina-
tions thereon. The implementation of action based on an affirmative
finding by the ITC, however, is reserved to others-except with res-
pect to unfair import competition.30 3
The ITC is also responsible for providing Congress annually with
factual information on the operation of the trade agreements pro-
gramme 304; establishing, maintaining, and publishing annually a sum-
mary of the data collected under the East-West Trade Statistics
Monitoring System 305; and-in concert with the Secretaries of Com-
merce and the Treasury-collect and publish uniform statistical data
on imports, exports, and-production.300
The Cabinet
The various Cabinet members are authorised under the provisions of
the Act to render advisory assistance on trade-related matters. 7 But
tie more important functions are those performed by the Secretaries
of Commerce and Labour under Title II of the Act, and by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury under Title III and V of the Act.308
, To the Secretary of Labour is delegated the primary responsibility
in, overseeing and implementing adjustment assistance for workers.3 0
He. is responsible for receiving petitions for adjustment assistance,3 10
publishing notice of their receipt,311 conducting public hearings
thereon,31 2 conducting investigations of the allegations therein, 313
297 See s. 202 (a). "9 8.s " 224.
299 As it amends ss. 303 and 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,,ss.. 331 (a) and 341 (a),
respectively, and s. 201 of the Anti-dumping Act, 1921. - - "
800 s. 321 (a).
301 s. 331 (a).
2 s. 341 (a).
303 See, supra, text related to n. 193.
304 s. 163 (b).
305 s. 410.
306 s. 608 (amending and expanding on the authority granted under ss. 484 (e) and
332 (g) of the Tariff Act of 1930).
307 See, e.g..ss. 132 and 431 (a):
308'Because the implementation of the various forms of Adjustment Assistance
is critically examined elsewhere, this portion of the Trade Act of 1974 will only. be
cursorily described here.
309 Ch. of Title II. See generally ss. 221-250. 310 s. 221 (a).
311 Ibid. 312 s. 221 (b).
SI1 ss. 221 (a), 224.
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making the determination of whether or not adjustment assistance is
warranted,114 and, if it is warranted, certifying the group of workers
who are eligible to apply for such assistance. 315 He is also responsible
for the general administration of the Adjustment Assistance for
Workers Programme."'
Likewise, the Secretary of Commerce is primarily responsible for
the implementation of the Adjustment Assistance for Firms Pro-
gramme,3 1 7 and, on consultation with the Secretary of Labour,318 for
the implementation of the Adjustment Assistance for Communities
Programme.3 19
Pursuant to authority granted him by Title III of the Trade Act of
1974 320 the Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to investigate,
determine the necessity of, assess and collect anti-dumping 321 and
countervailing duties.3 22 He is also responsible for prescribing regula-
tions necessary to designate articles eligible for Title V duty-free
preferences.3 23
Advisory and Co-ordinating Agencies
The Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations 324 is responsible for
providing the President with overall policy advice on sections 101 or
102 trade agreements.125 The President may choose to establish two
additional private-sector advisory committees, as necessary.326 The
Adjustment Assistance Co-ordinating Committee is responsible for the
overall co-ordination of the policies, studies, and effective and efficient
implementation of the Adjustment Assistance programmes.3 2 7 The
East-West Foreign Trade Board is responsible for monitoring "trade
between persons and agencies of the United States Government and
non-market economy countries or instrumentalities of such countries
to insure that such trade will be in the national interest of the United
States." 328
314 s. 223.
815 s. 222.
316 See generally ss. 221-250.
317 Ch. 3 of Title II. See generally, ss. 251-264.
318 s. 271 (e).
319 Ch. 4 of Title II. See generally ss. 271-274.
320 As it amends s. 201 of the Antidumping Act, 1921, and s. 303 of the Tariff
Act of 1930.
321 s. 321 (a).
322 s. 331 (a).
323 s. 503 (b) (1).
s24 Established by the President, s. 135 (b) (1), and comprising not more than 45
representatives of government, labour, industry, agriculture, small business, service
industries, retailers, consumers, and the general public: ibid.
325 s. 135 (b) (1).
326 s. 135 (c) (1) and (c) (2).
327 s. 281.
328 s. 411 (a).
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The Congress
The United States Congress reserved for itself the "right of final
approval" with respect to most, but not all'3 2  of the activities
authorised b the 1974 Act. Section 101 ostensibly grants the "basic
authority for trade agreements." 330 Immediately section 102 speaks in
broad general terms of "any barriers to (or other distortions of) inter-
national trade," but-is, oddly enough, entitled "non-tariff barriers to
and other distortions of trade," and it, apparently, also provides
authority for entry "into trade agreemefits .... " 331. Subsequent pro-
visions of ,the Act refer to both section 101 and 102 trade agreements
as if they were discrete entities. 3 2 Certain negotiational objectives
apply to both kinds of agreements, 33 but others to only one kind.3 3 4
It would appear that three conclusions may be drawn from this sub-
stantive gap: (i) that Congress intended that presidential authority
under section 101 should be absolute and that trade agreements
entered into thereunder needed no implementation; (ii) that Congress
intended that an isolated clause in section 121 would suffice to extend
its "right of final approval" to section 101 trade agreements; and
(iii) that Congress intended section 101 and section 121 agreements to
be one and the same. None of the above alternatives makes complete
sense; however, it is assumed that a hybrid of the first conclusion per-
tains: that where section 101 trade agreements are used to effect
outcomes provided for under other sections of the Act,335 the Congres-
sional "right of final approval " pertaining to that section will also
govern trade agreements so negotiated, but where a section 101 trade
agreement is concluded with respect to a general "basic authority"
to remove burdensome and restrictive duties (and other restrictions),
if this is possible, no Congressional approval authority exists.
Congress has the authority to approve certain categories of presiden-
tial actions, and without such approval they will not take effect. These
are (a) section 121 GATT revision trade agreements 330; (b) extensions
-beyond the initial 18-month period 33 -of extensive waiver authority
329 See e.g. s. 122 (balance-of-payments authority).
330 s. 101. Whether this means " all " trade agreements or only some is never
explicated. However, the first sentence of subsection (a) refers to " duties or other
[presumably similar] import restrictions." In any event, the section grants a 5-year
(later expanded by a 2-year residual period: s. 124) authorisation to enter into trade
agreements and manipulate duties in order to carry them out.
331 S. 102 (b).
332 See e.g. s. 104 (d): " If the President determines that competitive oppor-
tunities .... will be significantly affected by a trade agreement concluded under
section 101 or 102, he shall . (emphasis added).
333 See e.g. s. 106.
334 See e.g. s. 107.
335 For example, the President is granted authority under s. 203 (a) (4) to
negotiate trade agreements. He is also authorised to do so pursuant to s. 121.
336 s. 121 (c).
337 s. 122 (a).
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concerning MFN agreements with non-market economy countries 338;
(c) section 102 agreements 339; and (d) section 405 MFN commercial
agreements.° 40
Conversely, Congress has the authority to disapprove: (a) import
relief action taken by the President under section 203 (a) 841; (b) action
.taken by the President under section 301, but only when the action is
,against "any country... other than the country... whose restriction,
act, policy, or practice was -the cause for taking such action ..." 42;
(c) assessment of countervailing duties 843; (d) extensions of executive
.waiver authority concerning MFN agreements with non-market
economy countries 844 and (e) section 402 (b) and 409 (b) MFN com-
mercial agreements.348
, Congress may also, on the recommendation of the President, termi-
nate or deny the benefits of trade agreements 846 and declare section
.102 trade agreements implementing legislation 847 void for lack of
reciprocal concessions by a "major -industrial country." -48 Congress
is empowered to select from among its membership, 49 ten delegates to
serve as official advisors to the U.S. delegation at trade agreement
,negotiations.50 Congress also confirms the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations, 5'.. his two Deputies, 5? and the six ITC Com-
missioners.15 3
IV. THE PLAN FOR THE INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT
At a time when the Tokyo Round is in its initial stages, the negotiating
authority outlined in Title I is only a projection of future trends and
developments. There is considerable promise, borne out by the terms
of the Tokyo Declaration, that this projection will become a reality,
and the GATI will emerge as an international organisation, with its
own institutions and techniques of action. It will be able to initiate
action to move towards further trade liberalisation, and what is even
more important, will be equipped to handle disputes resulting from
conflicts of interests and differences of national policy.
8 s. 402 (d) (1)-(3). See discussion at nn. 173-181, supra, and corresponding text.
Most provisions are either " approvable " or " disapprovable. In this instance
Congress chose to retain both rights of approval and disapproval: s. 402 .(d) (4)'.
889 s. 102 (d) and (e) (3).
40 ss. 405 (c) and 407 (c) (1).
-4 s. 203 (c) (1).
542 s. 302.
31s s. 331 (a).
844 s. 402 (d) (4).
545 s. 407 (c) (3).
346 s. 126 (c) (1).
347 s. 126 (c) (2).
s48 Defined in s. 126 (d).
849 Five from the House Committee on Ways and Means and five from the
Senate Committee on Finance: s. 161 (a).
350 Ibid. 851 s. 141 (b) (1).
852 s. 141 (b) (2). 58 s. 172 (a).
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Should this happen, -international trade regulation will rest impor-
tantly in the international domain in the same manner as international
civil aviation, international postal or telecommunications services are
in the international domain, on the strength of international conven-
tions and agreements which have established international organisa-
tions to take charge of intergovernment co-operation in these areas.
It must be realised that, ever since 1934, when Congress vested the
Administration with an authorisation to negotiate trade agreements,
the role of tariff legislation has changed materially. From then on
tariffs were at least partly dependent upon the outcome of negotiations,
and in this area.of governmental activity the reins of power were in
the hands of the President and his Administration.
Creation of the GATT in 1947 changed the situation materially.
Although ignored by Congress, it developed its own legal system and
regime of international trade which served its members well until,
owing to changes in the international community, simple methods of
informal negotiation proved inadequate in the highly complicated
situations of modern economic co-operation. Should GATT develop
as projected in the 1974 Act and in the Tokyo Declaration, it may
regain the ability to handle conflicts resulting from international trade
or initiate further progress towards trade liberalisation. It will also
contribute significantly towards the solution of international problems
connected with the uneven distribution of wealth, uneven economic
and political development, and disparities in standards of living among
nations.
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